Commentary: Can Inner Experience Be Apprehended in High Fidelity? Examining Brain Activation and Experience from Multiple Perspectives by Henry D. Schlinger
GENERAL COMMENTARY
published: 09 March 2017
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2017.00360
Frontiers in Psychology | www.frontiersin.org 1 March 2017 | Volume 8 | Article 360
Edited by:
Alain Morin,
Mount Royal University, Canada
Reviewed by:
Uwe Peters,
KU Leuven, Belgium
*Correspondence:
Henry D. Schlinger
hschlin@calstatela.edu
Specialty section:
This article was submitted to
Cognitive Science,
a section of the journal
Frontiers in Psychology
Received: 25 January 2017
Accepted: 24 February 2017
Published: 09 March 2017
Citation:
Schlinger HD (2017) Commentary:
Can Inner Experience Be
Apprehended in High Fidelity?
Examining Brain Activation and
Experience from Multiple
Perspectives. Front. Psychol. 8:360.
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2017.00360
Commentary: Can Inner Experience
Be Apprehended in High Fidelity?
Examining Brain Activation and
Experience from Multiple
Perspectives
Henry D. Schlinger *
Department of Psychology, California State University, Los Angeles, Los Angeles, CA, USA
Keywords: pristine inner experience, introspection, consciousness, behavior, behavior analysis
A commentary on
Can Inner Experience Be Apprehended in High Fidelity? Examining Brain Activation and
Experience fromMultiple Perspectives
by Hurlburt, R. T., Alderson-Day, B., Fernyhough, C. P., and Kühn, S. (2017). Front. Psychol. 8:43.
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2017.00043
Hurlburt et al. (2017) argue that they can potentially produce high-fidelity apprehensions of
pristine inner experience that are radically non-subjective. In so doing, they claim that inner
experience is an important topic and, contrary to almost unanimous scientific consensus, a method
of introspection may be reliably used to directly apprehend it. In this and related articles (e.g.,
Hurlburt and Heavey, 2001; Heavy and Hurlburt, 2008), Hurlburt et al. reverse a general trend in
psychology over the past 100 years toward studying behavior and away from studying subjective
experience. In this commentary, I offer a logical and explicitly behavioristic (i.e., Skinnerian)
critique of some of Hurlburt et al.’s points.
By “pristine experience,” Hurlburt et al. mean phenomena (e.g., thoughts, feelings, sensations,
perceptions, etc.) that at a given moment appear directly “before the footlights of consciousness,” to
use William James’ words, which I take to mean when individuals become aware of the experience.
Notwithstanding the problems inherent in defining the terms “thoughts,” “feelings,” “sensations,”
and “perceptions,” what does it mean to become aware of something? There are likely many
phenomena that occur when people speak of “awareness” or “consciousness.” For example, we
speak of “consciousness” when organisms are awake, when they sense the environment, and
when they talk about the environment and themselves (see Schlinger, 2008). The latter usage
of “conscious” or “aware” seems most relevant in critiquing the concept of pristine experience.
Likewise, what does it mean to say that someone “observes” or “apprehends” inner experience? The
person is clearly not seeing or hearing the experience. We typically say that people “observe” inner
experience when they talk (to themselves) about the experience. On this view, both observing and
being aware of the experience are evidenced by the same behavior—talking about it. If by “observe”
or “apprehend” we mean talking to oneself, then on the analogy of the observer effect in physics it
may not be possible to separate the act of observing the inner experience from the actual experience.
Finally, what do we mean by “inner experience”? The term obviously refers to something private.
Hurlburt et al. offer no operational definitions of these terms and, without knowing exactly what
they are referring to, we must be skeptical about their suggestion that we can ever apprehend inner
experience or that the experience can be pristine.
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By “radically non-subjective,” Hurlburt et al. mean that the
inner experience is “not the result of opinion or impression but
instead is directly apprehendable, as Skinner and the behaviorists
required...” (p. 3). However, this statement misrepresents not
only what behaviorists require, but what all scientists require:
that phenomena be observable, at least in the initial, inductive
stages of science. Although, reports of inner experience are
objective, that is, they can be observed by others, the inner
experience itself cannot be; it is, after all, “observed” by only
one person in the sense that he or she labels or describes
it either overtly or covertly. To further muddy the waters,
descriptions of inner experience are metaphors because when we
say that we covertly (or “innerly”) “see” or “hear,” we are not
reacting to actual visual and auditory stimuli. In addition to the
subjectivity of the reports, the problem is they are inherently
unreliable (see Nisbett and Wilson, 1977; Johansson et al.,
2006).
Hurlburt et al. suggest that one way to solve the problem of
subjectivity and to demonstrate faithful apprehensions of pristine
inner experience is to correlate brain activation, for example, by
using fMRI, “with a variety of experiential perspectives” (p. 1).
The perspective they describe is an introspective method they call
Descriptive Experience Sampling (DES) in which individuals are
instructed to describe their inner experience when they hear a
randomly presented beep. In one example, Hurlburt et al. state
that Susan “clearly innerly sees her boyfriend and his mother
on a hillside next to the lake (much like she had actually seen
them yesterday)” (p. 3). But that would be impossible because the
boyfriend and mother were not actually there. Hurlburt et al. go
on to say that although Susan’s experience was private, whether
“Susan was or was not innerly seeing her boyfriend and his
mother is not a matter of subjective impression but of (Susan’s
radically non-subjective) direct apprehension” (p. 4). But Susan’s
experience was subjective. If by “apprehend” we mean perceive,
and by “perceive” wemean to react to, thenmaybe Susan did react
to some private experience. Because the experience was private,
we can neither verify nor completely trust what she claimed to be
reacting to.
Hurlburt et al. admit that “there is no well-developed
scientific strategy to evaluate a claim about the fidelity of
apprehensions/descriptions of private experience” (p. 5). At issue,
then, is whether the DES attempts at fidelity are credible. And
there is at least some reason to be skeptical of data from
fMRI correlational studies (see Eklund et al., 2016). The critical
questions are whether this elaborate and expensive attempt
to tackle the perennial problem of conscious experience that
has plagued psychologists (and philosophers) for centuries can
achieve the results Hurlburt et al. believe it can, and whether it is
worth the time and money.
Hurlburt et al. also claim that “first-person accounts are
scientifically acceptable within science,” that “inner experience
is indeed a defining aspect of the human condition, and
psychological science must use first-person reports of inner
experience...” (p. 2). To begin with, first-person accounts in
the natural sciences are not scientifically acceptable. Those
sciences are characterized by the discovery of universal laws of
nature. Even though many psychologists view their discipline
as a social science, I believe that psychologists should aspire
to be natural scientists in seeking universal laws of human
behavior. And first-person accounts are not going to get them
there. Moreover, humans cannot be the only species with inner
experience, although we are the only species that can talk about
it (see Schlinger, 2009; Morin, 2012). Thus, talking about inner
experience may be a defining aspect of humans, and that would
be scientifically acceptable to study because talking is behavior
that can be directly observed and measured.
A more parsimonious approach is to consider much of
the inner experience of verbal humans as an epiphenomenon
of human language. Thus, by studying human language
scientifically—what people say and why they say it—by inference
wemight understand at least one type of inner experience—inner
speech—just as natural scientists infer unobserved events only
after studying observed events (Schlinger, 1998). Hurlburt et al.
however, state that some individuals either rarely or never talk to
themselves; this is their “pristine experience.” Just because some
individuals report rarely talking to themselves does not mean that
is so. A simpler explanation is that they are not aware of doing so.
In other words, some people may never have learned to label their
covert self-talk.
The alternative to studying inner experience is to study
behavior and abandon, once and for all, psychologists’ obsessive
interest in mental events. Evolutionarily and psychologically, it
is what an organism does, that is, how it behaves, that determines
whether it will successfully navigate its environment and live long
enough to pass on its genes. Because reports of inner experience
will always be plagued by subjectivity and unreliability, a better
use of time and money would be to study observed behavior as
a subject matter. When Skinner (1977) wrote that “The appeal to
cognitive states and processes is a diversion which could well be
responsible for much of our failure to solve our problems” (p. 10),
he meant that human problems are behavioral and that focusing
on mental states is an obstacle to understanding and changing
our behavior.
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